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STATEMENT OF COVR^T OF APPEALS
JURISDICTION
The Respondent stipulates to the allegations of
jurisdication as set forth in Appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in denying
Appellant's counterclaim or offset against alimony arrearages
claimed by the Respondent?
II.
Did the Trial Court err in not granting Appellant an
evidentiary hearing on the counterclaim or offset issue?
III.
Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in awarding
Respondent attorney's fees?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent stipulates to Appellant's Statement of the
Case,

as set forth in the Appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Preliminary Statement.

It is pertinent for this Court to note that this is
second Appeal filed by Dr. William N. Foxleyf "Appellant", in
the past year concerning issues arising out of the modification
of the Divorce Decree entered between the parties.

Certain facts

addressed in the first appeal, designated as No. 890493-CA, filed
by the Appellant, which is presently pending before this Court,
are also relevant to the determination of the issues before the
Court in this appeal.

In an effort to fully inform the court the
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following chronology of additonal facts is submitted.
1.

In 1985, Deanna Foxley, "The Respondent", filed a

petition to modify the decree of divorce entered between the
parties.
2.

The Respondent's petition was heard by Judge Moffat

on March 22, 1988.

(The trial transcipt of this hearing is

designated herein as, "TRl".)
7, 1989.

The hearing was continued to March

(The trial transcipt of this hearing is designated herein

as, "TR2".)

(The issues upon which the Appellant has based his

appeal are not the result of a trial, as such references to
transcripts herein are to the transcripts of the hearings on the
Respondent's Modification of the Divorce Decree.)
3.

At the conclusion of the hearing on Respondent's

petition to modify, the Trial Court ordered the original decree
of divorce between the parties modified such that the Appellant
was ordered to pay an increased amount of child support and
alimony as well as other matters as set forth in the Minute
Entry of Judge Moffat, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
4.

The Appellant filed his first appeal, referenced

above, with this Court alledging Judge Moffat's modification of
the decree to have been an abuse of discretion and contrary to
law.
5.

The Appellant then moved for a stay of execution of

the judgment rendered by Judge Moffat.

Both the Trial Court and

this Court denied the Appellant's motion for a stay of execution
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based upon the Appellant's failure to obtain a bond as provided
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

The Appellant failed and/or refused to pay to the

Respondent alimony as set forth in the modified decree of
divorce, and also refused to abide by other provisions of the
modified decree of divorce.
7.

The Respondent, based upon the Appellant's failure

to comply with the provisions of the modified decree of divorce,
moved the Trial Court for Judgment for past due alimony and child
support owed by the Appellant to the Respondent and also
requested the Court to find the Appellant in contempt for his
failure to abide by the terms of the modified decree of divorce.
8.

The Trial Court awarded the Respondent a judgment

against the Appellant for the amount of $9,900.00, attorney's
fees, plus other relief based upon the Appellant's failure to
comply with the modified decree of divorce.
B.

Statement of Additional Facts

With regard to the Statement of Facts as set forth in
the Appellant's Brief the Respondent alleges that there are
certain inaccuracies in the Appellant's Brief and that
additional facts are required so that this Court is fully advised
of the facts relevant to this case.

Accordingly, the Respondent

submits the following additional facts.
1.
1976.

The parties hereto were married on October 8th,

At the time of their marriage both the Respondent and the

Appellant were students at Boise State University (Amended
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Findings of Fact, Paragraph 1; TRl 16:11-25).
2.

Subsequent to the parties marriage they relocated

Mexico so that the Appellant could attend medical school (TRl
21-22).
3.

The Respondent was not able to continue with her

education as a result of the parties relocation to Mexico (TRl
21:10-12).
4.

In 1980 the parties moved to Salt Lake City, Utah,

to allow the Appellant to continue his medical studies (TRl
23:24-25).
5.

During the course of the marriage three children

were born as issue to the parties (TRl 25:14).

The Appellant

also adopted the Respondent's daughter from a prior marriage
(TRl 28:13-17).
6.

After the parties relocated to Salt Lake City they

purchased a home located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, from Maurine Hegsted, as as referenced by the Appellant in
his brief.

It is however pertinent for this Court to note that

Maurine Hegsted is the aunt of the Appellant.
7.

The home was purchased by the parties pursuant to

Uniform Real Estate Contract with Maurine Hegsted.
8.

On March 23, 1982 the parties hereto obtained a

redevelopment loan to renovate and remodel the home located on
Wall Street, as referenced in the Appellant's Brief.

Again,

however, it is pertinent for this Court to note that the home
located on Wall Street was in substantial disrepair at the time
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the parties acquired the home and as such it required major
repairs and renovation tQ make the home habitable.
91

At the time the parties purchased the home on Wall

Street, it was approximately 80 years old, was structurally
unsafe and consisted of only two bedrooms for use by the parties
and the four minor children.

(The financial condition and needs

of the Respondent are more fully addressed at pages 18 and 19 of
the Respondent's Brief, in the Appellant's First Appeal,
referenced above.)
10f

The parties were divorced on or about September 22,

1983, not on August 22, 1983, as represented by the Appellant.
Ill

The Decree of Divorce provided that the Respondent

was awarded the marital home on Wall Street, and ordered her to
assume all obligations thereon.

It is pertinent to note that at

the time of the divorce hearing the Appellant had just graduated
from the University of Utah Medical School, the parties had four
young children, the youngest being less than one year old, and
that the Respondent was without employment and was on State
assistance.
i

12.

The Respondent and her children, because of the

financial condition of the parties, had no other alternative but
to accept the home on Wall Street, since this was the only
dwelling available for the Respondent and her minor children in
which to live.
13.

The original Decree of Divorce, which is attached

hereto as Exhibit "B", provided that;
-5-

The Respondent has an interest in the Appellant's
Medical Decree, and is awarded the sum of $10.00
per month as alimony, and at such time as there has
been a material change of circumstances of the parties,
the issues of child support and/or alimony may be
reviewed.
14.

As referenced above, Judge Moffat, after two days

of hearing on this matter, determined that there had been a
material change in circumstances and Ordered that the amount of
child support and alimony in the Decree be modified.

Child

support was increased from $150.00 per month per child to an
amount consistent with the Child Support Guidelines and alimony
was increased from the amount of $10.00 per month to the amount
of $1,350.00 per month.

(The Findings of Fact entered by Judge

Moffat are attached hereto Exhibit "C".)
15.

The Respondent, based upon the financial straits

which the Appellant left her at the time of the divorce became
increasingly delinquent in house payments, payment of property
taxes, as well as in the payment of other of her obligations.
16.

In early 1989 the Respondent offered a deed in

lieu of foreclosure to the Appellant's aunt, Maurine Hegsted,
since the home on Wall Avenue was inadequate for the needs of the
Respondent and her children and because the Respondent was unable
to afford the costly structural repairs which the home required.
17.

Maurine Hegsted refused to compromise the debt with

the Respondent and thereafter initiated foreclosure proceedings
against the Respondent.
18.

The Respondent, as referenced in the Paragraph 10
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of the Appellant's Statement of Facts, filed for Chapter 7
Bankruptcy.
19.

The Respondent's bankruptcy was necessitated soley

because of the Appellant's aunt's foreclosure on the home on Wall
Street.
20.

The Respondent purchased a new home in May of 1989.

The new home provided the room necessary for the Respondent and
the children, and the opportunity for the Respondent to raise her
children in a safe environment.
21J

The Respondent's decision to purchase the new home

was, in large part, based upon the anticipated increase in income
she would recieve from the alimony and child support which the
Appellant was ordered to pay in the modified decree of divorce.
22J

The Respondent's debts were discharged without

exception by Order of the Bankruptcy Court, including any
obligation which the Respondent may have had to the Appellant's
aunt, Maurine Hegsted, and to the Appellant.

(See Exhibit "D"

attached hereto).
231

At the time the Respondent moved from the home on

Wall Avenue she was in arrears in payments to the Appellant's
aunt, as referenced above.

The delinquent payments were not all

accrued during one period of time, as alluded to in the
Appellant's brief, but were the result of the Respondent being
unable to make on time her payments at various times since the
original divorce.
24^

The Appellant was current in the payment of
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alimony, $10.00 per monthf and child support $150.00 per child
per month from the time of the divorce to the time of the Decree
was modified by Judge Moffat in 1989.

Said alimony and child

support was inadequate considering the Appellant's increase in
income from his practice of medicine and the needs of the
children and the Respondent.
25.

The Appellant, at page 9 of his brief, alleges

the Respondent had "spent over $4,500.00 on the purchase of an
airplane instead of paying her property taxes and mortgage
payments on the marital home".

The Appellant has raised this

same argument before the Trial Court and this Court in his prior
appeal.

The Respondent did not "purchase" an airplane, as the

Appellant is well aware.

The Respondent has never purchased an

airplane, has never had a pilot's license and never intended to
obtain a pilot's license.

The facts are the Respondent had

approximately $4,500.00 remaining to her in funds which were
acquired prior to the parties divorce.

The Respondent maintained

these funds in an account for her and the children for an
emergency.

The Respondent was requested by a friend and asked to

invest this money in an airplane he owned and told her that if
she invested with him he would rent the airplane and they would
derive an income from the rentals which income would be in excess
of what the money would earn if the money remained in a bank.
The Respondent was also told that she could have her investment
returned.

The Repondent invested in the airplane in 1985. To

date she has received no money from the investment and has
initiated a lawsuit for the return of her money.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
The Trial Court did not err in denying the Appellant's
claim for off-set.
Each of the issues presented by the Appellant in
his brief concerned alleged errors or abuses of discretion by the
Trial Court*

It is well settled that the Appellant Court will

review the decision of the Trial Court with considerable
indulgence and the decision of the Trial Court will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings of the Trial Court, or the Trial Court has
i

clearly abused its discretion.

Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-5, as

amended 1953, Adams v. Adams, 593

P2d 147 (Utah 1979), Smith v.

Smith, 751 P2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988).
The right of off-set is based upon the principles of
justice and equity.

In the present case the Trial Court

determined that the equitable remedy of set-off was not
applicable and that the Appellant's motion for set-off should be
denied under the circumstances of the case.
The Trial Court correctly denied the Appellant's motion
for set-off under the facts of this case.
II.
The Trial Court did not err in failing to allow the
Appellant a hearing on its motion.
Rule 4-501 (8) of the code of Judicial Administration
provides that motions may be decided by the Court without a
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hearing.

Rule 4-501 (9), of the Code of Judicial Administration

provides that the Court may summarily deny a parties motion for a
hearing.
The Trial Court, after hearing argument by counsel and
upon review of the memoranda and other pleadings in this case,
determined that a hearing on the Appellant's motion was
unnecessary.
It was proper for the Trial Court to deny the
Appellant's motion for a hearing.
III.
The Trial Court did not err in granting Respondent's
motion for attorney's fees.
The Respondent brought a motion for judgment against
the Appellant based upon the Appellant's failure to abide by the
Modified Decree of Divorce.

The Trial Court properly took

judicial notice of the reasonable and customary rate for the
documents and pleadings in front of it which were necessitated by
the conduct of the Appellant.
The Appellant failed to raise an objection to the award
of attorney's fees in the Trial Court and, as such, the Appellant
has waived his objection to the entrance of attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
APPELLANTfS CLAIM FOR OFFSET.
A.

The Appellant requested by motion that the Trial

Court grant an off-set against past due alimony owing from the
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Appellant to the Respondent and also requested the Trial Court to
terminate all future alimony payments from the Appellant to the
Respondent.

The Appellant1s motions were initially heard on

November 14, 1989/ by Commissoner Allphen.
denied the Appellant's motion.

The Commissioner

Thereafter the Appellant rejected

the Commissioner's recommendations and the matter was set for
argument, on February 5, 1990, before Judge Moffat.

Both the

Appellant and the Respondent submitted memoranda, affidavits, and
other pleadings in support of their respective positions on the
parties respective motions.

Judge Moffat denied the Appellant's

motion for off-set and to terminate the payment of alimony.
The Appellant however, at Page 9 of his brief, asserts
that the "Court's position (concerning the motion for off set) is
clearly in error and not supported by the facts".

This ascertion

by the Appellant is not supported by any reference to authority.
The Appellant was given every opportunity, over a period of
approximately five months, to state a sufficient case but failed
to adequately do so, and as such the Trial Court denied his
motion.
In Utah all aspects of preceedings in divorce matters
are equitable.

Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P2d 1126 (Utah 1974),

Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P2d 231 (Utah 1971), Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-3-5, as amended 1953.

The Trial Court properly held

under the circumstances of this case, that the Appellant was not
entitled to an off-set or that alimony should be terminated.
Accordingly, the Appellant's argument that there is no
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basis to support the Court's decision to deny the Appellant an
off-set is without support on review of the record and is without
merit in law.
B.

The right of off-set is based upon the principles

of right, justice and benevolence is a doctrine which equity
adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in
justice, equity and good conscience ought to pay it.
Set-off and Counterclaim §3f page 8.

80 C.J.S.

An equitable set-off will

be allowed only when a party seeking it shows some equitable
ground therefore, and where such a find is necessary in order to
promote justice, or to give effect to a clear equity of the party
seeking it.

See, 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim §5, page 12.

In the present case both Commissioner Alphen and Judge
Moffat determined that under the circumstances the granting of a
set-off would not promote justice or the principles of equity and
denies the Appellant's motions.
C.

It is well settled in Utah that in a divorce

action, absent an abuse of discretion, the Appellate Court will
not subsitute its judgment for that of the Trial Court.
Shaw, 682 P2d 853 (Utah 1984).

Lord v.

In the present case the Trial

Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the
Appellant's motion for off-set and as such the order and judgment
which is the subject of the appeal should be upheld.
D.

The Appellant cites for the Court in his Brief the

the proposition that the doctrine of set-off should be addressed
pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §553 of the United States
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Bankruptcy Code.
It is first pertinent to note in this regard that the
Appellant's Claim against the Respondent was discharged by reason
of the Bankruptcy Courts granting the Respondent's petition for
bankruptcy, as referenced above.

As such, the Respondent's

obligation to the Appellant was extinguished.
Secondly, the principles of set-off in bankruptcy
actions are similar to those applied in State Court actions. The
right of set-off is discretionary in the Bankruptcy Court and the
Bankruptcy Court, in considering the issue of set-off, must
exercise its discretion under the general rules and principles of
equity.

Brunswick Corp. v Clements, 424 P2d 673 (C.A. Tenn.

1970).

it has been specifically held that an action brought

pursuant to Sections 11 U.S.C. §553 of the Bankruptcy Code Act,
is a matter to be determined by the Court using the principles of
equity.

See Givens v. Hall, 569 P2d 1232 (Wash. App. 1977).
If this matter had been determined by the provisions of

the Bankruptcy Code, the results, considering the equities of the
case and in the interest of justice, would have remained
consistent with the ruling of the Trial Court.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO PROCEED WITH PROOF
CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF OFFSET.
A^ The Appellant states that the Appellant had a "legal
right to ascert the claim of the mortgage holder against the
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Appellant as an off-set".

The Appellant did assert a claim for

off-set and the Trial Court considered the Appellant's claim,
accordingly, this allegation is moot.
The Appellant continues by stating;

"to deny him (the

Appellant) a hearing on the issue (of off-set) was error and a
denial of due process".
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration
provide that motions, such as the motion of the Appellant which
is the subject of his appeal, may be decided by the Court without
a hearing.

Rule 4-501 (8) provides specifically:

"Decision of a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless requested by the Court, in which
event the clerk shall schedule a date and time
for such hearing." Emphasis added.
Even in cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issue therein on the merits with
prejudice the Trial Court may summarily deny a parties motion for
a hearing.

Rule 4-501 (9) of the Code of Judicial Administration.

Further the issue of set-off was addressed by the
Appellant's counsel in the November 14, 1988 hearing before
Commissioner Allphen and February 5, 1990 before Judge Moffat.
Thereafter, the Appellant filed a Motion for further hearing in
this issue.

As a result of the argument made during the hearings

and by the memoranda and other pleadings filed in this case the
Court was fully advised as to the nature of the parties claims.
Both Commissioner Allphen and Judge Moffat determined that they
had received sufficient information to be fully advised in the
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premises and entered their ruling denying the Appellant's Motion
for off-set.
The Appellant's allegations on this issue are without
basis in authority and are without merit.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Judge Moffat, upon being apprasied of the issues of the
case, determined that the Respondent should be awarded attorney's
fees of $500.00 against the Appellant.

This award was based upon

the Respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause and other
pleadings which were necessiated by the Appellant's failure to
make child support and alimony payments as well as to abide by
other Orders of the Court.

The Court properly took judicial

notice of reasonable and customary rate for the documents and
pleadings in front of it which were necessitated by the conduct
o f the Appel 1 ant.
It is also pertinent for this Court to note that the
Appellant failed to raise his objection to the award of
attorney's fees in the Trial Court and as he has waived his
objection to the entrance of attorney's fees.

Matters not raised

in the Trial Court may not ordinarily be considered for the first
time on appeal.

Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P2d 405 (Utah 1977), State

By and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 495 P2d 817 (Utah
1972),

Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 375 P2d 456 (Utah 1961)
The award of attorney's fees by the Trial Court was

proper and was justified and should be upheld by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Under the circumstances as presented by this case it
was reasonable and justified for the Trial Court to deny the
Appellant's Motion for off-set.

The Appellant was not denied due

process in the Court's failure to allow a hearing in this matter,
under the rules of practice of the Trial Court.

Finally, the

Trial Court found that the Appellant had not complied with the
orders of the Court and rendered a judgment in favor of the
Respondent, and awarded the Respondent $500.00 for attorney's
fees.

The Court award of attorney's fees was proper and should

be upheld by this Court.
The Respondent believes this second appeal filed by the
Appellant is nothing more than a transparent attempt by the
Appellant to avoid payment of the judgment rendered against him
by the Trial Court, to avoid the provisions of the Amended Decree
of Divorce and to continue his scheme to harass to Respondent,
and as such the Appellant should be found liable for the
Respondent's reasonable expenses including attorney's fees
pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this

/Vy

day of September, 1990.

Robert W. Hughes/'
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
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£l —

day of Septmeber,

1990, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Brief was
mailed, postage prepaid, to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 500
West, Bountiful, Utah

84101.

Robert W. Hughes
5 FOX-2AP.1
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MAR 2 1 1989
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

DEANNA FOXLEY

Civil No. 824901591
Plaintiff f

vs.
W1LLLAM M. FOXLEY,
Detendant.

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the Court based on the plaintiff's Petition to
Modify the Decree of Divorce to seek an increase in alimony and
child support, and testimony having been taken and evidence
admitted, argument to the Court having been made, and the Court
being fully advised in the premises makes this its
DECISION
The Court finds that a substantial change of circumstance
has occured in that the defendant's income has increased since the
date of divorce from virtually nothing or approximately $50 per
month to a figure which is not completely clear but which can be

EXHiBITA
00052b

interpreted am being am high mm $224,000 a year and oartalnly una*s

T\im

no circumstances lass than approximately $120, 000 par y*ar«

Court further finds that the plaintiff has done an admirable job of
caring lor herself and the children under very adverse
circumstances and in educating and raising said children.

She also

hau been struggling to obtain her own education to aid in the
support of the children.

The Court finds that the sum of $1,547

per month is the correct amount for child support and the sum of
$L,JS0 per month is fair and equitable as alimony.

The Court

further finds that the defendant should be required to provide
health and dental insurance for the minor children of the parties
and he is hereby ordered to do so.
The Court does not find it necessary to invoke the recently
dec Lared novel theory of "equitable restitution" as enunciated by
the Utah.Court of Appeals nor is it necessary to invoke the
provisions of the divorce decree wherein Judge Condor awarded an
interest in the defendant's medical degree to the plaintiff.

The

Court finds that the change of circumstances above set forth are
sufficient to justify the award herein without further findings
regarding the questions relating to the defendant's medical
degree.

Court rinds that attorney's fees should be awarded to the

plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's fee is as
set forth in the affidavits provided by plaintiff's attorneys in
the sum of $4,394 plus her costs incurred herein.

Plaintiff's

000527

attorney will draft appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and amended decree toyimplement this decision.
Dated

t h iis

J2/

day of March, 1989.

District/Cou
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FILMEDI

1

THOMAS N. AKNIITT, J P .
At I o r n c y t o r P l a i n t i l l
900 Ni'Wlloust.' B u i l d i i K j
10 l i x c h a r u j e P l a c e
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
04111

Telephone:

r

(801) 363- >65(»

^ U c : County Utah

AA

/<7 /

*//)

*^*

'*

'*& •

'

/OV^

IN Tl-IK THIRD JUDICIAL D1STRTCT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
oooOooo
DEANNA POXLEY,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OP DIVORCE

Civil No. D82-1591

WILLIAM N. POXLEY,
Defendant
-oooOooo-

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the above-entitled
Court, on Thursday, the 10th day of June, 1983, at the hour of
10:00 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her
attorney, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant, not appearing
in person but through his attorney, Rulon R. Price, and the
Court having heard the stipulations of counsel, having heard the
sworn testimony of the plaintiff, having received proffers of
proof from both counsel, having received documentary evidence,
having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed the
contents of t tie Court's file, and good cause appearing therefor,
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EXHIBITS

and having heretofore made and entered the Findings of Pact and
Conclusions of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore

existing between the parties are dissolved, and a Decree of
Divorce is granted to the plaintiff, to become final three months
from I he date of entry hereof.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and

control of the four minor children, subject to reasonable rights
of visitation in the defendant, and while the defendant is
f et> id m g oufcuiek?—the btafco of—Utah,—U*—*r« awarded telephone
visitation with the minor children and his mother is awarded
liberal and fair visitation with the minor children.

That both

parties are ordered to attend counselling concerning their
rolat ionship with the minor children and for the benefit of the
minor chiIdren.
J.

That the defendant

is ordered to pay to the plaintiff

child support in the sum of $150.00 per month per child, $600.00
in the aggregate, through the clerk of the Court, until the
minor' children reach the age of majority.
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4. That the plaintiff io awarded an interest in
defendant's medical degiee, and is awarded the sum of $10.00 per
Turret'
month
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That the plaintiff is awarded the home of the parties

located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with
all equity therein, and the defendant

is ordered to execute a

Quit Claim Deed, conveying all of his interest in said property
io

the plaint iff.
6.

That the plaint if J is awarded

the 1976 Toyota pick-up

truck, and the defendant is awarded the 1973 MG Midget automobile,
and each party is ordered to execute vehicle titles or other
documents to effect the transfer of said vehicles.
7.

That each parly rs awarded the personal property

currently in his or her possession, except that the defendant is
awaided t tie following property currently in the possession of
the plaintiff:

black camera case with contents, silver camera

case with contents, tripod, o-n larger, antique clock, red
pettified stump, oak bench, any rifles in the possession of the
plaint lit, his rocks, minerals and lossiis owned prior to the
marriage, one-half of rocks, minerals and fossils acquired during
the marriage, all small antiques including waffle iron, insulators],
and old lions, walnut coffee table, black rocking ehair# medical
books and other personal books, two boxes of antique books, and
the c o m collection including all paper money; the plaintiff is
awarded the following personal property currently in the
possession on the defendant:

camping equipment consist inq of
- I-

two sleeping bags, a Coleman stove, and a Co leman lantern; and
the tools at^

awarded to the plaintiff

months and then an*

for her use for three

ordered divided between the parties, or

the plaintiff shall give the defendant
retain possession of the tools.
t.he plaintiff

from prior

That

a $100.00 credit and
the furniture be.1onq.Lng to

to the marriage which is in storage J S

awarded to the plaintiff, and the defendant

is ordered to make

arrangements to convey possession of that property to the
plaintiff.

That t he pI a m t iff • s saving cert ificate consisting of

money received from the sale of tier home prior to the marriage
is awarded

to the plaintiff.

tt. That the plaint iff is ordered to assume and pay the
mortgage arrearages ex isting on the home of the parties and hold
the defendant

harmless therefrom, and the defendant

to assuiru? and pay all of his student
and hold the plaintiff
9.

harmless

is ordered

loans and the Visa account

therefrom.

That both parties are ordered to obtain and maintain

health and accident

insurance* for

children of the parties

if such

tire benefit of the minor

insurance is available

through

his or her employment .
10.

That the defendant

is ordered to obtain and maintain

life insurance on his lite, if life insurance is available fhrouglji
his employment: as a group plan with either the minor children as
beiud • ic tar res or with a bank or similar

financial

institution

as trustee for tin* benef it o( the minor children.
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11.

That the defendant, is ordered to pay the* sum of

5 1 / J U O . O O to the plaintiff for her reasonable attorney's fees.
DATMO this

I U day oi

-^-V

,

1983.

BY THE COURT:

D i a l . i lift

A p p r o v e d as t o

fo

£

Judqt

..^f-«_—

Third JuiiiciAiOt&ttjct

JUL - 6 1989

HUBERT W. HUGHES (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Val ley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Ldke City, Utah 84101
Telephone:

SAL ( LAiiC CuutA i V

(801)534-1074

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY t

)

Plaintiff,

)

AMENDED
FINDINGS OP PACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

VS.

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,

)

Defendant.

)

THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the
hour of 2.00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7, 1989
at

the hour of

10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify a

Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge
of

the

above-entitled

Court,

sitting

without

jury.

The

Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W. Hughes and
the Defendant,

William

N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S.

Er iclcsen.
The Court

having

heard

testimony

and

received evidence,

argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully
advised

in the premises is now prepared to enter Its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8,

EXHIBIT C

1976.

At

the

time of

the marriage,

the Plaintiff

was

an

undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at
Ho I tie State University.
2.

The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree

of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August
23, 1983 t;o become final three months from the time of entry.
3.

At

the

time

of

the

divorce,

the

Plaintiff

was

unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and
had an Income, not including amounts received from student loans,
of approximately $50.00 per month.
4.

That at

the

time of

the divorce, the Plaintiff had

expenses of SI,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of
$895.00 per month.
5.

The Defendant

graduated

from the University of Utah

Medic-di School in June of 1983.
6.

During the parties marriage the parties had four minor

children to wit:
was

Christine, born September 19, 1970.

the daughter of the Plaintiff

adopted

by the Defendant

(Christine

by a prior marriage who was

in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May

23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15,
1982.
7.

During the marriage, the Plaintiff could not pursue her

lormal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at

2

various limes during the marriage to assist in the support of the
family, and

due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant

for a

major portion of the time.
The

parties

acquired

few

household

furnishings,

appliances or other personal property during the marriage.
8.

For approximately the two years after the parties were

divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required
and received public assistance.
9.

The

admirable

Court

finds

job of caring

that

the

for and

Plaintiff

educating

has

done

an

the parties minor

chiIdren.
10.

The

Court

finds

that

the Plaintiff

and

the

minor

children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the
d ivurce.
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant

personal sacrifices
the divorce.

to further her education since the time of

After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors

degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in
19B9.

Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D.

*ompiet ion

of

this

course

of study

will

Length of time for
depend

on

course

requirements.
12.
an etlort

The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in
to maximize her income potential.

The testimony and

evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field
will be difficult without additional education and that even with
3

additional education, employment

opportunities are projected

to

he limited in the future.
13.

During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-

time employee and had a gross income of $9,600.00.
14.

In

1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where

he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and
gynecology in that vicinity.
lb.

During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant

was able

to provide

a tax

income of $128,437.00.

return,

the Defendant had a gross

The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised

of wages he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately
6 months, at the Hueriy Medical Center in Michigan, and from the
private practice of medicine.

The Defendant earned $112,406.00

from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of
pt'dc t ice .

16.

The earnings

of

the Defendant

potential have been considered

as well as his future

by the court for the purpose of

determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified.
17'.

The Defendant's present income is not completely clear

tmr the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross Income
tan be

interpreted at> being as high as $224,000.00 a year but

certainly

under

no

circumstances

less

than

approximately

$120,000.00 per year.
lb.

The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a

Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a
similar amount to a retirement plan in 1988.
4

19.

The Court

finds

change of <: ircumatances

that

In

there has been a substantial

the parties Income

since the time of

t he d lvune .
20.
or

Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification

the decree of divorce

however,

find

is warranted.

it necessary

The Court does not,

to invoke the theory of

"Equitable

Restitution'1 as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is
i t necessary

to

the Court

to

invoke

the provisions

of

the

original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an Interest
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff an<A the
minor children are sufficient

to justify a modification of the

decree.
21.

Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of

t lie children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be
increased

to the appropriate amount reflected

in the judicial

district's support guidelines.
22.
yrobb

The Court

part-time

finds

income

that
of

the Plaintiff has an adjusted

$800.00

per

month

and

that

the

Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month.
23.

The proportionate share of the parties combined Income

is 10* and 90* for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively.
24.

The Court

finds

that based upon the Plaintiff's and

Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the
5

minor

children

$504.00

Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of

for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total

child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor
children.

The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines,

should

to the Plaintiff

pay

support.
support

The Court

further

for Corinne should

the sum of $1,549.00
finds

that

the amount

for child
of child

increase to the sum of $607.00 per

month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of
age on that date.

Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the

Defendant's child support obligation will Increase to $1,638.00
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child.
25.

The Court further finds that pursuant to the support

guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25% during those periods which
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more
days with the minor chlld(ren).
26.

The Court

finds that at the time of the hearing the

Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in
excess of $3,000.00 and that the Plaintiff's residence was in
jeopardy
that

of being sold by the county for back property taxes;

the Plaintiff

is nine payments

behind on her mortgeige

payments; that the Plaintiff has incurred substantial debts for
medical, dental and orthodontic expenses for the children; that
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in
poor condition and is in need of substantial and major repairs,
including repairs to the roof, foundation, interior and exterior
6

wails and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home,
as well

as other

repairs; and,

that

the Plaintiff

and

the

children are in need of new appliances and household furnishings,
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also
new clothing and shoes.
The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as
when the Decree was entered.
27.

The Court finds that at the time of the modification

hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce.
28.

The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the

monthly

alimony

to be paid by the Defendant

to the Plaintiff

should

be increased

month.

Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989.

29.
required

from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per

The Court further finds that the Defendant should be
to provide health and dental

children of the parties.

insurance for the minor

The Court further finds that it is

equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including
orthodontic

expenses, not paid by health and dental

insurance

should tie divided equally between the parties.
30.

The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded

to the Plaintiff
fees would

in this case and that a reasonable attorney's

be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs

here in.
7

incurred

31.

The Court

finds

that

that

the Plaintiff's Counsel's

tees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering
the length of time expended and the complexities of the Issues,
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable.
32.
be

That the Court did not consider whether alimony should

terminated

but

would

entertain

further

hearing

upon

application of either party or future petitions for modification.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
since

There has been a substantial change of circumstances

the Decree of Divorce was originally

entered

in this

mat ter.
2.

It

is fair and

reasonable, based upon the change of

circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the
Defendant should be increased

in accordance with the schedules

set forth in the child support guidelines.
3.

The child support

Plaintiff

tor support

of

to be paid by the Defendant to the
the parties minor

children

should

increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor
children.

The amount

of

child

support

to be paid

by

the

Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor
children

should

be increased

to the amount

of $1,638.00 per

month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989.
4.

The Plaintiff

has

endured

and continues

to endure

biyn.il: icant and substantial hardships and has made significant
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she
8

hat* a significant

and substantial need at present and in the

future fur an increase in alimony.
5.
Payable

It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony
from

the Defendant

to the Plaintiff

be increased to

$l,3ft0.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989.
6.

The Defendant

should

provide

health,

accident and

dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the
part J es.
7.

It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded

attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred
herein.
DATED this

1
i

day of ( L O s V i s ^

^ 1989,
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Attorney
At t o r n e y ffor
o Defendant

MISC:Foxley

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, DISTRICT OP UTAH
In Res
FOXLEY, pEANNA S.
1208 EAS? MANOR CIRCLE
SALT LAKtf CITY, UT 84124
DS8AN s $16*58-3049

Case NO. 89-06741-B
Da** Piled 11/03/89
Chapter 7
DISCHARGE OF DE^TOR(S)

It is appearing from the record that the above-named debtor is
entitled to a discharge, IT IS ORDERED:
1. tfhe debtor is released from all personal liability for debts
existing on the date of commencement of tl*i» case, or deemed to have
existed *n such date pursuant to 1348(d) 0* the Bankruptcy Code
(Title 13-# United States Code).
2. >ny existing judgment or any judorfant which may be obtained
in any cc?urt with respect to debts descritfad in paragraph 1 is null
and void ** * d^t^rmiT^tiwv ol p%t%ont\ \iakvLv^f ^t tk% 4&&t&?,
except:
*) Debts determined nondischargeabJ* by the
Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 1523(a)(2),
(4) and (6) of the Bankruptcy CO&*t and
p)Debts which are nondischargeabl* pursuant to
§523(1), (3), (5), (7), (8) and (9) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
2. £his order does not affect any pending complaint to have a
debt declared nondischargeable pursuant to 1523(a)t2), (4) and (6) of
the Bankruptcy Code, nor does it prohibit filing of a complaint under
S523(a)(*)# (3), (5), (7), (8) and (9) of the Bankruptcy Code.
4. All creditors are prohibited from attempting to collect any
debt that has been discharged in this casl*
5. £y virtue of §525 of the Bankruptcy Code, no government unit
or private employer may terminate the employment of or discriminate
with respect to employment against the debtor solely because relief
\iaa sought, ixv t&% Bai&r\X£t»c? Court,*

Dated: February 20, 1990
TRUSTEE:

JUDITH *• BOULDEN, BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

HARRIET E. STYLER

•XH

SCHEDULE A-3

Mane of creditor [including last known
holder of any negotiable instrument] and
I complete •ailing address including zip
code

Page 3

CREDITORS HAVING UNSECURED CUIPIS WITHOUT PRIORITY

Specify when clain was incurred and the consideration therefore
when claim is contingent, unliquidated, disputed, subject to
setoff, evidenced by a judgment, negotiable instrument or other
writing, ©r incurred as partner or joint contractor so
indicate; specify name of any partner or joint contractor on
any debt.

Indicate if claim
is contingent,
unliquidated, or
disputed

Amount

of
Claim

1

4. Loan Servicing Center
Drawer 99175
Ft. Worth, TX 76199-0175

Student loan, 9/84.

8,500.00

5. Perkins HDSL Loan Program
University of Utah 165 SSB
Salt Lake City, UT 84112

Student loan, 9/84

4,710.00

6. Noly Cross Hospital
1045 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Medical services, 8/88.

250.00

8. ZOU
2200 South 900 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84137

Merchandise sold on open account, 5/89.

500.00

9. Mervyns
P.O. Box 4916
Hayward, CA 94540-4916

Merchandise sold on open account, 6/87.

175.00

10. William Noall Foxley
P.O. Box 818
Winslow, A2 86047

Claim arising from hold harmless provisions *# divorce
decree, granted in 1982.

11. Dudley Amoss
255 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Legal services, 2/89.

12. Rubers & Odette Sayler
P.O. Box 808
Grassrange, HT 59032

Personal loan, 5/1/89.

2,500.00

13. Redevelopment Agency of SLC
285 West north Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Redevelopment loan, 6/83.

5,GOO.00

14. Pristine Fox ley
1206 East Manor Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84124

Personal loan, 5/89.

T 500.00

15. Discover Card
P.O. Box 56005Q
Pasadena, ZA 91186-0058

Merchandise sold on open accour:, i/S8.

Contingent, unliquidated
disputed.

30,000.00

450.00

50C.00
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